

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 GENEVA 13838 01 OF 02 141939Z
ACTION SS-25

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INRE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4074
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 13838

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652 : XGDS-1
TAGS :PARM
SUBJECT :COMMENTS ON PLENARY, SEPTEMBER 14, 1978
(SALT TWO 1847)

REFS: (A) SALT TWO-1849, (B) SALT TWO-1848

1. AT SEPTEMBER 14 PLENARY, SEMENOV'S STATEMENT (REF A)
REAFFIRMED SOVIET POSITION THAT CRUISE MISSILES EQUIPPED
WITH MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE WARHEADS SHOULD
BE BANNED. HE STRESSED THAT FAILURE TO BAN MIRVED CRUISE
MISSILES WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL THRUST OF
THE AGREEMENT AND WOULD OPEN UP AN ARMS RACE IN REENTRY
VEHICLES. HE IMPLIED U.S. INSISTENCE ON DEVELOPING
"MIRVED" CRUISE MISSILES WOULD BE MATCHED BY COMPARABLE
STEPS ON THE SOVIET SIDE.

2. I TABLED U.S. PROPOSALS REGARDING THE FORMAT FOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF AN AGREED DATA BASE (REF B).

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SECRET

PAGE 02 GENEVA 13838 01 OF 02 141939Z

3. AT POST-PLENARY SEMENOV STRESSED ARTICLE IX(E) BAN,
SAYING IF ONE SIDE FOLLOWED MULTIPLE WARHEAD CM COURSE
OTHER SIDE WOULD TAKE STEPS TO MEET IT. HE ALSO CALLED
U.S. PROPOSAL TO BAN ICCMS "ILLOGICAL" AND INCONSISTENT
WITH AGREED PROTOCOL LIMITATIONS. SEMENOV SAID SIDES
AGREE DATA BASE IS AT DELEGATION LEVEL, DATA BASE TO BE
RECORDED AS OF DATE OF SIGNATURE, CATEGORIES AGREED

EXCEPT HEAVY ICBMS, FIGURES IN SOME CATEGORIES AGREED, AND SEMENOV ASSUMED WORK WOULD CONTINUE AND BE COMPLETED. HE THOUGHT ONE-TIME NOTIFICATION AS OF DATE OF SIGNATURE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT, TOGETHER WITH ARTICLE XVII, INCLUDING NOTIFICATION OF ACTIVITIES COMPLETED AND UNDER WAY, PLUS NTM. QUESTION OF FORMAT COULD BE CONSIDERED FURTHER. I SUPPORTED U.S. DATA BASE PROPOSAL AND AMPLIFIED RATIONALE.

4. RE TELEMETRY ENCRYPTION, I THEN IMPLEMENTED INSTRUCTIONS ON DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES, STRESSING IMPORTANCE OF ARTICLE XV AND U.S.-PROPOSED SECOND COMMON UNDERSTANDING THERETO, AND EXPRESSING U.S. CONCERN RE CONCEALMENT MEASURES IN TRANSMISSION OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION DURING SOVIET TEST OF JULY 29, 1978. I NOTED SUCH MEASURES WOULD BE PROHIBITED WHEN TREATY ENTERS INTO FORCE AND SAID IT WOULD BE CONSTRUCTIVE STEP IF THESE MEASURES CEASED PROMPTLY. SEMENOV, SPEAKING WITHOUT NOTES, SAID U.S. WAS MOVING BACKWARD IN COMPARISON WITH UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN THIS REGARD AS RESULT OF LENGTHY NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ISSUE WHICH HAD BEEN RESOLVED. HE THOUGHT SECOND COMMON UNDERSTANDING PROPOSED BY U.S. WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING BUT HE WOULD CONSIDER FACTUAL REFERENCES I HAD JUST MADE. I ASKED WHETHER SEMENOV WAS SAYING OUR PROPOSED SECOND COMMON UNDERSTANDING WAS "CONTRARY" TO THE SIDES' EXISTING UNDERSTANDING. SEMENOV REPEATED THAT IT WAS "INCONSISTENT" WITH THE UNDERSTANDING.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 GENEVA 13838 01 OF 02 141939Z

ING, BUT WE SHOULD RETURN TO QUESTION SINCE I HAD RAISED IT AGAIN AND HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT HIS SPECIALISTS. I SAID WE SHOULD RETURN TO THE ISSUE BECAUSE IF SOVIETS HAD SUBSTANTIVE DISAGREEMENT ON CONTENT OF SECOND COMMON UNDERSTANDING, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO IDENTIFY THIS DISAGREEMENT. SEMENOV AGREED TO RETURN TO THE MATTER.

5. HIGHLIGHTS OF OTHER POST-PLenary CONVERSATIONS :

ROWNY/BELETSKY. GENERAL BELETSKY DWELLED ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF PERMITTING MULTIPLE WARHEAD CRUISE MISSILES, SAYING THIS WOULD OPEN UP NEW CHANNELS OF COMPETITION IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND INTRODUCE A HIGHLY DESTABILIZING ELEMENT IN THE ARMS RACE. ROWNY STATED THAT IT WAS SOVIET MOMENTUM IN ICBMS AND NOT CRUISE MISSILES WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO INSTABILITY. BELETSKY COUNTERED BY REFERRING TO NUMEROUS SPEECHES BEING MADE BY U.S. OFFICIALS AND OTHERS WHICH SUPPORT THE SOVIET VIEW THAT THE FORTHCOMING SALT AGREEMENT WILL ASSURE PARITY AND STABILITY BECAUSE THE GREATER SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT IN ICBMS IS COUNTERBALANCED BY A GREATER NUMBER OF U.S. REENTRY VEHICLES.

JOHNSON/STARODUBOV. STARODUBOV COMPLAINED THAT THE SUBJECT OF DEPRESSED TRAJECTORIES AS WELL AS THE PROPOSAL TODAY BY THE U.S. FOR ADDITIONAL REPORTING OF DATA BASE INFORMATION BETWEEN SIGNING AND ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY WERE UNNECESSARY AND COULD ONLY DELAY NEGOTIATIONS. TURNING TO CRUISE MISSILES HE SAID THE SOVIET SIDE HAD DIFFICULTY UNDERSTANDING THE U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD KEEPING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF UNLIMITED DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES. HE EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT

SECRET

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 13838 02 OF 02 141941Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 13838

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THE SOVIETS CONSIDERED THE SUBJECT OF LIMITATION OF TOTAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS AS BEING SO IMPORTANT. IF THE UNRESTRAINED BUILDUP OF CRUISE MISSILES, INCLUDING MULTIPLE WARHEAD SYSTEMS, WERE TO CONTINUE THEN THE USSR WOULD BE DRIVEN TO JOIN THE RACE OF INCREASING THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS, AND THE ARMS RACE WOULD ACCELERATE. HE OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD ALREADY RECOGNIZED A LEGITIMATE NEED BY THE U.S. FOR SOME LEVEL OF CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT, SINCE IT HAD AGREED TO ALLOWING 20 CRUISE MISSILES PER HEAVY BOMBER.

WHITMAN/PAVLICHENKO. PAVLICHENKO ATTACKED WESTERN ASSISTANCE TO CHINA'S MILITARY PROGRAMS AND INDICATED THAT, AT SOME POINT, GROWING CHINESE MILITARY STRENGTH WOULD REDUCE SOVIET READINESS TO LIMIT STRATEGIC ARMS. HE COMPLAINED ABOUT U.S. INTRODUCTION OF NEW ISSUES, CITING DEPRESSED-TRAJECTORY SLBMS.

TALBERT-KANGAS/JOURAVLEV-GRIGORIEV. SOVIET SUBMARINER,
CAPTAIN FIRST RANK T.V. GRIGORIEV WAS INTRODUCED AS NEW
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PAGE 02 GENEVA 13838 02 OF 02 141941Z

ADVISOR OF SOVIET DELEGATION. BEKETOV ON EXTENDED LEAVE
AND HIS RETURN TO GENEVA OR REASSIGNMENT WILL BE DETER-
MINED LATER. GRIGORIEV COMPLAINED ABOUT THE COMPLEXITY
OF THE U.S. DATA BASE PROPOSAL AND EXPRESSED PARTICULAR
CONCERN ABOUT SCC INVOLVEMENT IN SALT NEGOTIATIONS. HE
QUESTIONED NEED FOR AGREED DATA AS OF A PRIOR DATE AND
ALSO QUESTIONED NEED FOR A TREATY PROVISION.

6. NEXT PLENARY WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20. EARLE

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